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SUMMARY

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3. Burmese Defense Minister suggests repatriation of Chinese Nationalists:

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Burmese Defense Minister Ba Swe suggested to Under Secretary of Defense Foster, during his visit to Rangoon, that the problem of Chinese Nationalist troops in northeastern

Burma might be solved by the "surrender" of 2,000 hard core Nationalists to American or other neutral officers. They could then be repatriated through Thailand or, if necessary, through Burma.

The American Embassy believes that Ba Swe's suggestion might offer a solution if it could be assumed that Taipei would issue the orders and that they would be obeyed.

Comment: Taipei professes to have little control over the Nationalist force in Burma and on several occasions has indicated a preference that it remain in a position to harass Communist China.

Ba Swe has previously suggested repatriation of the Chinese Nationalists and last summer stated that he would begin military action against them if they had not been evacuated by fall.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4. Mossadeq reportedly plans ultimatum on oil sales:

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Prime Minister Mossadeq plans to demand an early declaration from the Department of State to the effect that it has no objection to the purchase of Iranian oil by Americans, If the United States does

not comply, Mossadeq will infer that the United States is "unfriendly."

Comment: The proposed demand is in line with new efforts by various Iranian leaders to blackmail the United States into assisting Iran in its oil problem. The withdrawal of the British from Iran has also stimulated extremist pressure on Mossadeq to cancel American aid programs in Iran.

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7. Britain to await Egyptian initiative in Suez negotiations:

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Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the Suez base will not be reopened before next January, unless the Egyptians press for talks, according to an official of the British Embassy in Cairo.

Britain is not anxious to begin talks until its Chiefs of Staff have completed their appraisal of the entire military situation in the Middle East.

The official stated that the staff study, one result of the recent Anglo-Turkish talks in London, is expected to take two months, and may result in a lower estimate of the strategic importance of the Suez base.

Comment: Previous British strategic studies have concluded that there is no satisfactory alternative location for the Middle East defense base. British military planners are now convinced, however, that the lack of Egyptian cooperation limits the value of the Suez base, and they are prepared to recommend some concessions in order to hasten a settlement of the Suez issue.

EASTERN EUROPE

	8.	Unusual military activity	reported in Bulgaria: 25X1	
25X1A			extensive mobilization of reserves was in progress between 17 and 20 October	
	L	south-central Bulgaria. measures or indications o personnel in the border ar	in the Second Army area in central and no unusual security of war hysteria, and observed no military rea.	25X′

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Comment: Other reports indicate that during mid-October an extensive call-up of reserves, requisition of vehicles, and the use of schools as barracks resulted in considerable excitement and tension in the First Army District, which includes Sofia. The concurrent mobilization in the First and Second Army areas is in contrast to the phased mobilization test which was conducted in 1951.

There has been no recent evidence of unusual military activities in the other Satellites. Neither Orbit propaganda nor other evidence suggests a Soviet intention to launch hostilities in the Balkans in the near future.

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